New Delhi: With eight days left to go for Donald Trump's maiden India visit as US President, both sides are trying to hammer out some big-ticket announcements and a possible partial trade agreement that has been stuck for months now. However, trade should not be considered a defining element of the relationship, says Rudra Chaudhari, Director of the leading global think-tank Carnegie India.
A scholar, author and strategic expert, Chaudhari feels that a trade agreement still looks unlikely and Modi may have to find a way to get around the tough negotiation Trade Representative Lighthizer and appeal to Trump himself.
Senior journalist Smita Sharma spoke to Rudra Chaudhari about the challenges in the bilateral relationship, expectation from the visit, India's tight rope walking with Russia and Iran, to firefighting on Kashmir, CAA and NRC as well as the Indo-Pacific strategy vis a vis China.
Q: You have been having a lot of conversations from Delhi to DC. What are you hoping to be the significant takeaway from the Trump visit?
A: Any visit by a US President to India is a landmark event in itself. The fact that President Donald Trump is coming across here, spending two days in Delhi and in Ahmedabad where there will be a large public function, it is encouraging for the relationship as a whole. Every relationship, especially with US, now and then needs a nudge from the principals. It is a good time for US to focus on India, for Trump to come down and provide that nudge in itself.
Q: Trump will be facing elections in a few months. Are you looking at Trump at his strongest best, unlike many Presidents who may have become a lame duck in the last few months of their term?
A: He is not your usual US President. Is he at his strongest best? It will be if he puts up a good fight. He comes to India at a pivotal time right after his impeachment hearing. In India, there wasn't much media coverage of the impeachment hearing itself. There seemed to be this assumption that the Senate would give him a free pass and hence that would be okay. But the fact is this is a President who had to face impeachment trial which is a pretty big deal in international history itself. The choice of coming to India soon after the impeachment in the same month is interesting in itself. It also shows that Trump in his own way cares about the relationship and India and more importantly cares about PM Narendra Modi in his own way.
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Q: But he has even tried to mimic PM Modi or made constant comments about Harleys in the past. There have been these remarks that have made New Delhi uncomfortable. Is it a part and parcel of who Trump is and best for India to ignore them as fringe issues?
A: The trade part is not a fringe issue, it is an important issue. We have to be careful not to over place importance within the larger strategic aspect of this relationship. So two points on the trade part. When Trump came into office, it shocked not just the US system but certainly was a shock to the Indian system as much to the rest of the world. Fact that he followed through on a lot of his campaign promises on trade which is essentially in countries where he believed they had a free ride, had an effect on India. Whether it was aluminium, steel, GSP (Generalised System of Preferences), all of these hit India in one way or the other. There is this tension on the trade front. But we have to be careful of being a bit too mesmerised on trade as a defining element of this larger relationship. You have a President coming to India. The fact is you may not even have the possibility of a slim trade agreement that both sides have been trying to hammer out now for the last eighteen months. That might have less to do with Trump and more with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer who has proven to be a formidable opponent when it comes to these issues.
Q: On trade, it is Washington DC which has been upping the ante including Trump himself. The entire pressure that New Delhi must reduce the trade deficit which it has tried doing through purchase of oil and gas, to defence equipment from US, to recalibrating oil purchase from Iran. How big a friction is trade today in ties? What are the reservations on the agreement from industries?
A: The trade agreement has a lot to do with Lighthizer as an individual who has had his own views for the last 30 years. It was sanctions or tariffs on semiconductors back in the 80s or 90s. It is sanctions or tariffs now in a whole range of issues where US feels there is a general deficit in itself like in aluminium, iron, agriculture or various products. From the Indian side, my sense is we are taking a larger view of the relationship. If you divide the relationship between trade and strategic or trade and defence for instance, defence has become the real silver lining of the US-India relationship. The problem is every time we talk about the US-India relationship we look at the big ticket outcomes like massive defence agreement, nuclear deal. US-India nuclear agreement is not going to happen again in any form or shape. So we need to also temper our expectation of outcome from visits. This visit is much more about tenor, about equilibrium and confidence in the larger strategic relationship. There is a very good chance there will be no trade agreement. But it does not take away from the importance of the visit. On the defence side, what you might find is the new narrative more around emerging technologies, a conversation between India and US on setting up compatible R&D hubs.
Q: Where does the implementation stand of foundation parts inked like LEMOA?
A: It is a slow process. Defence is about harmonisation. Back in 2005 when one of the most important steps taken by the then governments was the Next Step In Strategic Partnership, it was all about harmonisation of laws, principles and standards so that US-India could exploit and explore a strong strategic relationship. When it comes to LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) there are still questions to be asked. On the other hand, where you have seen a movement in this relationship is on DTTI (Defense Technology and Trade Initiative). You have seen a huge amount of progress on DTTI. Both sides have come to a basic common understanding of standard operating procedures. So defence is a slow process, but we are beginning to see a light at the end of the tunnel.
Q: Does the shadow of CAATSA still loom large over India's purchase of S400s from Russia? Will that be a subject of conversation?
A: Whether it is Russia, oil or Iran, these will always be issues that the Indian government will have to negotiate around. I do not think that anybody takes it for granted on the Indian side. But I think we have demonstrated a high degree of maturity in dealing with the US today. As a country, we managed to manoeuvre CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions), the sanctions on Iran which has hit us pretty hard in real crude oil terms and at the same time managed to keep relations with Iran, Russia and US. This is not just a question of contemporary handling of issues, but historically we have done quite well in dealing with unpredictable American approaches. Of course, at the moment it is a lot more unpredictable than it was. But my sense is that the Indian approach seems to be - get what you can from Trump and manoeuvre around these tricky issues.
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Q: Post-Doklam, we saw Delhi reset ties with China and Russia because the American position did not live up to expectations? Will this tight rope walk become trickier for India moving ahead as Trump looks to keep Pakistan happy keeping in mind his peace plan for Afghanistan?
A: When it came to Doklam, I really do not think that we expected the Americans to stick their neck out. If you look at most of the statements coming out at that time of State Department or White House, they were fair as far as India was concerned. Last thing that India would want back in 2017, when you were on a knife edge with China, you had more than a hundred Indian soldiers eyeballing, more than a 100 PLA soldiers in disputed Chinese-Bhutanese territory, we would not invite an escalation of that crisis with undue American interference. I do not think that that (Doklam) has affected the India-US relationship at all. Secondly, when it comes to Pakistan, Trump has his own way with international leaders. When Imran Khan traveled out to DC, it looked like two rock stars being able to spend time with each other. They were enamoured by each other. But the larger structural opposition to Pakistan has not changed. There is pressure on terrorism. Just yesterday, the Pakistanis under pressure from the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) have claimed they will lock up Hafiz Saeed. This is good news but we have been in this story before. We have seen this clock before, we will see what actually happens. But the pressure on Pakistan is not going to end just because Imran Khan does well in Washington.
Q: A resolution has been moved in US Congress with significant support on Kashmir. Four senators including Lindsey Graham close to Trump, have written a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo on Kashmir, CAA and NRC. Has New Delhi been able to reach out to the Congress on its 'internal actions' and will these come up during Trump's Visit?
A: The Indian mission in US and our bureaucratic machinery, reach out to the US Congress all the time. There is a fairly healthy dialogue in general on a range of issues between Indian officials and US Congress despite some of the distractions we see often on social media. Is it a tricky time? Yes. Is it a time when the US Congress has a lot of questions about the present state of India, sometimes considering India's internal dynamics sometimes not considering them? Yes. Will that come up as a major issue between Trump and Modi? My sense is No. This will be left very much at the level of state departments, for bureaucracy. Maybe Trump makes a mention to Modi, he is an unpredictable, untrained mind in many ways. This works for him domestically in America. If he says something to Modi I do not think it is an issue. He is not coming here with an agenda. A letter written by Lindsey Graham and three other senators is not going to determine Trump’s conversation themes with Modi.
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Q: Beyond the strategic component on the people to people ties, we have heard Trump talk about immigration reforms and Indian concerns on H1B visas. Where does that stand today?
A: It is a real issue. This is not just Trump's abstract criticism of immigration. It hit Indian workers hard. We all know people who have been hit hard by the unpredictability in the H1B scenario. The Indian side takes it very seriously. But my sense is these are issues that in one stage or other have been matters of friction in the past. That will be left at the bureaucratic level itself. This visit will provide a boost to the relationship. My hope is that the Indian side can get around Lighthizer, appeal to Trump himself and get them to think clearly about what is actually a very slim trade agreement between Indian and the US.
Q: What has been the significant transformation in the Indo-Pacific from the US perspective involving India?
A: It works both ways. It is about both India and US involving each other. The United States has understood that more and more. That is where Indian diplomacy has worked quite well in the last couple of years. Indo-Pacific is now not in the American strategy map. It is very much in the Indo or Indian strategy map itself. We are still trying to figure out what the contours of this map really are. Is it simply about exercises, blue economy, about economic connectivity and integration, or is it about putting hard power behind four or five key military, that gang up that have some degree of free reign over the Indo-Pacific. That is yet to be seen. Apart from the Indo-Pacific itself, you have seen a lot more energy in the Quad. You asked the question on China earlier. My own sense is India keeps tactical bilateral relations or operational bilateral relations at an even pace, working with China. At the strategic end the pressure point is the Quadrilateral, the Indo-Pacific. The accelerator on the diplomatic side is bilateral, the pressure is quadrilateral.
Q: The constant claim though is Quad is not meant to exclude or contain China?
A: But It does and we should understand that.
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