Exclusive: Chinese claims on Galwan not new, says MIT Professor Fravel

Hyderabad: Chinese territorial claims over entire Galwan Valley are not new and in line with their earlier maps of the area says strategic expert Professor M Taylor Fravel. Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director, Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professor Fravel says that based on maps he has identified through Chinese government resources, Beijing’s claim over Galwan always lay up to the estuary or river bend and has not changed during this ongoing tense standoff with India. However, he reminds that the difference is about the level of Chinese activity in the area in the past in support of its claim.

Speaking to senior journalist Smita Sharma from the US, Professor Fravel also expressed concerns that restoration of status quo ante may never be fully possible as both sides have to agree to what it was in the first place. Asked about US statements in support of India Professor Fravel said it is not sure as to what extent would America get involved if the border situation were to flare up further and India would also have to decide it wants to align more closely with Washington DC.

A scholar of China’s foreign and security policies, Professor Fravel is author of the book ‘Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949’. On the issue of Russia’s role in the conflict in the context of its own equations with China and defence ties with India, Fravel reminded that historically Russia has chosen to remain neutral in disputes involving major powers it shares an important relationship with. Professor Fravel believes that China is now adopting a more conciliatory tone as it would not like relations to deteriorate any further with India given its complex worsened ties with the US. However, he cautioned that India should be prepared for Chinese efforts in raking up new border disputes in its neighbourhood with countries like Bhutan and Nepal to needle New Delhi.

Q- India and China are defusing tensions at the LAC with slow disengagement’s reported that have now completed at Patrolling Points 14,15 and 17. Pangong So remains the next big focus. Political engagements have been dialled up. The two SRs (Special Representatives) spoke. What is your sense of the level of incursion that happened in the first place?

It is not easy to answer because in some ways we are reliant upon Indian news reports from various government sources and what some people are able to observe through satellite imagery. What complicates it further is that although the LAC (Line of Actual Control) is taken to be a sort of de facto boundary over which one can measure whether or not China has ingressed into Indian territory or from China’s point of view if India has ingressed into its territory. But there is no actual LAC on the ground we can use while looking at the symmetry. But it appears that at least in 3 areas, maybe more, at Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Pangong Lake where China has made efforts to move up to what it views as the LAC and at least in 2 of these cases or perhaps in 3 China has moved across certainly what India views as the LAC. Pangong Lake has a lot of opacity in this area between Finger 4 and Finger 8. With India viewing the LAC at Finger 8, China at Finger 4. In the Galwan Valley it is a bit more complicated but basically has to do with this bend in the Galwan River right before it meets the Shyam. India’s view is perhaps that LAC lies kilometre south-east in the area around the bend and China’s view is that it basically lies more or less on the bend. You have from India’s view China making intrusions in these areas. China which has been more reticent in terms of its media on what is happening has also been a real challenge but we have pretty good information that they have moved right up where they believe to be the LAC.

Q- How do you view China’s claim of sovereignty over Galwan? There is a map sourced from China’s National Platform for Common Geospatial Information Services under the Ministry of Natural Resources - how do you interpret that?

My assessment now is that China’s claim based on the most recent map I was able to identify has not changed in the Galwan Valley. China has always claimed most of the Galwan Valley more or less up to where the Galwan River bends. It is sort of the last five kilometres just over the Galwan from where it runs east to west basically meets the Shyok river. But the rest of the Galwan Valley China has always claimed. Different Part of the Galwan Valley about 40 kms away from the current focus of ongoing tensions actually featured quite prominently in the1962 war. The map that I was able to identify from this Chinese government website does place China’s claim roughly 5 km up the last stretch of the Galwan River from where it bends but important to note in the map are two Chinese characters which translated mean wither estuary or river mouth. And if you look at the Chinese statements they have focused a lot on this term estuary. So when China says Galwan Valley and India says Galwan Valley I am not actually sure that they are exactly talking of the same area and that creates a misunderstanding.

Q- Your assessment is that the Chinese claim over Galwan is not a new one or a substantive tactical shift?

There does not appear to be a change in China’s claims such that it is moved west 5kms to the Shyok. It has stayed at the bend. There is a separate question regarding China’s presence in the area, It is not clear to me how frequently China has patrolled up to its claim. Many of the Indian reports indicate that China’s presence was new and thus alarming. So one has to distinguish between the claim as it is drawn on the map and sort of level of activity in support of that claim. But I think Chinese statements and this map and some others as well it is pretty clear that from their point of view the Galwan Valley ends where the river bends and does not extend any further. That does make sense of their other statements mainly that on June 6 the disengagement plan, which of course collapsed, China says both parties agreed to build outposts on either side of the estuary or river mouth. And it makes sense if one thinks what is happening at the bend which is the site of disengagement today. In some way, it boils down to maybe a kilometre along the river because India’s view is that LAC appears to extend a kilometre east into what China would be viewed on its side.

Q- Following the initial televised comments by Prime Minister after the all-party meeting in wake of the Galwan violence and China’s attempt to project it as vindication of its stand, do you think those statements were damaging or caused a lot of confusion?

It does appear to have caused confusion which is exacerbated by the fact that although LAC plays a central role in what is happening, we do not necessarily know where it exactly lies.Then if you are trying to make conclusions about whether or not territory has been violated, you want to know where that Line was in order to be able to make that judgement. But China never really moved beyond the bend and that is the extent of their claim. So one can really perhaps make sense of what the Prime Minister was saying. But on another level, it did provide certainly a useful set of talking points for the Chinese diplomats and apparatus. Two nights ago there was a half-hour discussion on CCTN on a show called Today’s Focus. There they ran a clip talking about the situation and used PM Modi’s remarks to say that China in fact had not violated Indian territory. Implying they had not moved across their claim line.

Q- There seems to be confusion about the buffer zone- If that has been altered or us India lost out on?

From the news reports I understand each side has agreed I think to move back by around 1.5kms. The critical question is from where are they withdrawing. Are they withdrawing from India’s view of the LAC or from China’s view of the LAC at least in terms of Galwan Valley? India might view that it is withdrawing further if it is moving further away from the LAC. But the buffer zone is a good idea. Clearly the effort to implement the previous disengagement plan collapsed because troops came in close proximity to each other. There was confusion about who was supposed to be where. The actual details are very difficult to fully understand. By basically not permitting patrols from either side within roughly a 3kms stretch should hopefully create some tactical space on the ground so there is room to address these issues at the diplomatic and political level.

Q- Even after the two SRs spoke while India spoke about strictly observing status quo China spoke of defending the territorial integrity and blamed Indian soldiers for Galwan clashes. Former NSA SS Menon flagged that the absence of restoration of status quo ante is missing from the statements. Is that a worrisome concern and how long haul is it going to be for the restoration of the status quo as it was in April.

It is not clear to me that the status quo ante will fully ever be restored. It is also not entirely clear what the status quo ante was. In the Pangong area, it is more clear where China appears to be trying to permanently occupy Finger 4 and build infrastructure there. So status quo ante would be the removal of that infrastructure and the Chinese presence. In the Galwan area is status quo ante that China does not patrol the way that it used to patrol or is it that LAC remains where India sees it. If you focus on restoring status quo ante you have to be clear about what is it that you are restoring. It will be something that both sides agree upon. That was certainly missing from the statements but one can perhaps understand that at least as a first step if you are trying to disengage forces to prevent escalation on the ground you might not necessarily focus on that first and foremost. The Chinese statement did certainly make reference to the rights and wrongs of the situation. But in my view, it was pretty conciliatory once the Chinese reaffirmed their claim. But the rest of the statement I thought was focused on trying to restore the relation between China and India to the way it was before all of this happened. Talking about jointly working together, development and revitalisation which was all a happy talk, which I would not completely write off as cheap talk. It does signal that China is not interested in pushing this any further now because it does realise that it risks a much greater deterioration of relations with India at a time when its relations with the US have already deteriorated.

Q- US Secy Of State Pompeo has said he has spoken a few times to Foreign Minister Jaishankar. US statements are also reflective of its own worsened ties with China. But to what extent will US actually be willing to be involved in the conflict outside of statements if the situation were to escalate?

Certainly given the focus the Secretary of State has placed on China in last six months and even more broadly in the context of US strategic competition with China, it is not at all surprising what he said about India. The real question is would this lead to

some substantial change in American behaviour or support for India if the situation with China were to escalate further. That I am not sure, It is very easy for the Secretary of State to highlight anything he views as Chinese aggression or bad behaviour whether involving India or any other country. The degree to which the US will get involved will depend on a number of different factors. First the level of escalation that occurs at the border. Secondly India’s desire for American involvement. Here India faces a tricky choice. At least in the Trump administration and emphasis on strategic competition which many views more as strategic confrontation US-China relations have really deteriorated very quickly. So India would have to ask itself if they want to become a part of this American approach to China fully. Which probably could happen if America decided to provide much bigger support to India. It does not have an easy answer as to what might be the best move for India going forward. But it is clear that there is an opening here for India and the US to improve their relations with each other. There certainly is a shared focus on the challenges that China presents to both countries. And even if there is not another escalation on the border, there may be an opening for thinking about ways in which the United States and India can cooperate in different areas going forward.

Q- Defence Minister Rajnath Singh traveled to Moscow for the Victory Day Parade. India has ordered new weapons and arms from Russia. Given Russia’s own dynamics with China what role do you see it play on this Sino India conflict? And is there still a shadow of the US sanctions under CAATSA on Indian purchase of S400s?

From a military perspective, Russia is India’s most important partner in the sense that it is the source of much of India’s advanced weaponry. Whether it is air defence systems, fighter aircraft and certainly platforms that will be relevant for the Indo- China border. That stands in contrast in some ways to what the US is providing which is in other areas. But certainly, Russia will play a very important role going forward. In terms of the border itself, at the Russia India trilateral meeting with China, Russia sort of indicated it did not want any part of this. It did not want to get involved. Russians want to have it both ways. They want to continue to sell lots of weaponry to India which supports the Russian defence industry. On the other hand, Russia and China have a robust relationship now much of which is created by sharing of a common interest in counterbalancing the United States. I do not think that Russia would want to risk that over China India border over which it does not have any strong interest or stake. There is an interesting parallel here to 1962 although somewhat in the other direction. In the run-up to 1962, one of China’s conclusion was that the Soviet Union was not sufficiently willing to support China against India. Russia tried to take a neutral position. So in terms of history, Russia really has no interest in getting involved in a dispute between two major powers with whom it has an important relationship.

Q- But would India placing more weaponry orders with Russia may have caused heartburns in DC?

It does reflect the larger limit on defence cooperation that you can have. I do not think that anyone in DC would require India to cuts its arms ties with Russia for the sake of deepening ties with the US. But it does underscore that it is a very complicated relationship and that as US-Russia ties deteriorate that could also have an impact on what the US might be willing to do with India as well. India US Cooperation appears to be in other areas where Russia is not playing a strong role. Whether it is transport aircraft systems, intelligence sharing. Security relationship is broad and there is ample room for increasing to some degree US-India cooperation. But if India is worried about improving its air defence system it will turn immediately to Russia. US does not even have an air defence system it could sell because the US has not been worried about protecting its own air space because of nature blessed geographic situation with two oceans on either side and relatively small countries from a military perspective to our north and south of our borders. So long as Washington assesses that purchase of weapons from Russia do help India create a more robust deterrence vis a vis China, it will certainly not let that get in the way of deepening relations in other areas. But it does underscore the delicate geopolitical dance India, in particular, finds itself in at the moment.

Q- There is an entire satellite imagery war now happening with differing interpretations. How worrisome do you find the images in terms of the troop build up at the LAC? And add to it China raking up new border controversies in India’s neighbourhood. For instance, staking claim to the Setkang Sanctuary in the Eastern sector with Bhutan which caught Thimpu by surprise but it rejected the claims strongly. Should India be prepared for China to rake up new fronts in days ahead?

It does appear to be an attempt by China to wedge a rift between India and Bhutan by raising a relatively large area which may have been discussed in the early 1980s and subsequently dropped by China as a way to get Bhutan perhaps to go ahead and finalise a border agreement it reached with China in the 90s. But from a broader strategic perspective, China’s main worry at the moment is not India. It is the United States. Relation with the US is China’s most important bilateral relationship which will have the greatest impact on China’s ability to achieve its goals. Historically China has always viewed its relation with India as important but not nearly as important as some other ties like with the US. But it means that China wants to maintain its strong position on the border, it wants to prevent India from making gains especially in the western sector, prevent India from strengthening its position there because of the historical sensitives around the road that connects Tibet to Xinjiang and rest of China. So China does not want to devote too many resources and get too involved in managing its relationship with India at the expense of its relationship with the US. Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave a very lengthy speech which underscores this point that this really is where China’s diplomatic and strategic attention is focused. This means that although you will see China needling India in a couple of different areas in Bhutan, maybe Nepal, to the extent that it consolidates China’s strong position on the border so that it can focus on its ties with the US.