Chenab-Beas Link: Why One Tunnel Has Alarmed Pakistan

New Delhi: A proposed Chenab-Beas Link tunnel in Himachal Pradesh has opened a new front in the Indus Waters Treaty dispute.

The tunnel seeks to transfer water from the Chandra, a headstream of the Chenab, towards the Beas basin.

And Pakistan is alarmed. Its concern is not that the project will immediately dry up the Chenab. The deeper fear is that the link may establish the first physical and political precedent for transferring water from the western river system allocated to Pakistan into India’s eastern river network.

The Chenab is among the most important rivers for Pakistan. It enters Pakistan’s Punjab province and supports a large irrigation network.

Its waters are also redistributed through link canals towards areas associated with the Ravi and Sutlej systems.

Any change in its flow can have a wider effect.

What the Project Proposes

The link reportedly involves a barrage near Koksar and a tunnel of about 8.7 kilometres towards the Beas basin.

The proposed annual transfer remains disputed. Pakistan has cited a figure of about 1.9 million acre-feet (MAF).

Some assessments suggest that the actual transfer may be lower.

It is a very miniscule portion of the Chenab’s annual flow, which is over 36 MAF. The project cannot empty the river. It will not suddenly deprive Pakistan of its entire water supply.

Its importance lies in the precedent. Pakistan fears that a limited transfer today could create the tunnel alignment, engineering experience and political justification for larger schemes in the future.

Under the Indus Waters Treaty, the six main rivers of the Indus basin are divided into two groups.

India has unrestricted use of the waters of three eastern rivers - Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan has the main use of the waters of three western rivers - Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

India also retained limited rights over the western rivers. It could use their waters for domestic requirements, specified irrigation, hydropower generation and limited storage.

For India, the proposed project is within its territory and permissible.

For Pakistan, it appears to weaken the basic river division on which the treaty rests.

India Cannot Stop the Chenab

Political statements often create the impression that India can simply close the rivers flowing into Pakistan. It cannot.

India presently lacks the storage capacity, diversion infrastructure and available land required to hold back the enormous flows of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab for prolonged periods.

Most Indian hydropower projects on these rivers are run-of-the-river projects. They have limited pondage. They can temporarily alter the timing of water releases.

They can retain some water during filling. Maintenance and sediment-flushing operations may also affect downstream flows for short periods.

But they cannot permanently stop the river.

India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terrorist attack. It did not abrogate or formally terminate the treaty.

The distinction is deliberate. Abrogation would close the agreement. Abeyance suspends its implementation while leaving open the possibility of restoration in the future.

In practical terms, India has stopped routine water data sharing.

It has suspended normal cooperation under the Permanent Indus Commission. It is also not accepting the existing dispute-resolution proceedings.

Pakistan has, therefore, lost some of the procedural access it earlier enjoyed. Pakistan can no longer seek inspections or raise objections through treaty mechanisms in the same manner as before.

This reduces its capacity to delay Indian projects.

Abeyance has changed the political and procedural environment in which projects are planned.

The legal position is contested. Pakistan argues that the treaty does not permit unilateral suspension. It maintains that the agreement remains fully binding and that India must continue observing all its provisions.

India argues that treaty cooperation cannot continue unchanged when the broader bilateral relationship has been transformed by sustained terrorism. India also rejects the present arbitration process.

As a result, international proceedings continue without Indian participation.

Still, the legality of the Chenab-Beas Link will, therefore, depend on its final design, the quantity transferred, the seasonal pattern of diversion and the provisions under which India justifies the project. India should publish these details clearly.

Opacity will only strengthen Pakistan’s international campaign.

Pakistan must also look inwards

Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus system is real. Its water insecurity, however, is not entirely caused by India.

Pakistan has limited storage capacity. Large quantities of water are lost through seepage, leakage and inefficient irrigation.

Sedimentation is reducing the capacity of existing reservoirs. Political disagreements have also blocked major projects.

The proposed Kalabagh Dam is the clearest example. It has remained stalled because Pakistan’s provinces have been unable to reach a consensus.

These internal failures have made the country more vulnerable to even small changes in upstream flows.

Pakistan has had more than six decades to build storage, improve canals and modernise water use. Progress has remained inadequate. Blaming India cannot substitute for domestic reform.

Pakistan is also attempting to involve China in the dispute.

Its argument is simple. India may be upstream of Pakistan, but it is downstream of China on rivers such as the Brahmaputra and Sutlej.

The comparison is not exact. A large part of the Brahmaputra’s water is added through rainfall and tributaries after it enters India. China cannot easily stop the entire river.

It can, however, influence lean-season flows, hydrological information and dam operations.

Pakistan will use this argument to internationalise the dispute.

It may also seek support from China and encourage future intervention by the United States or the World Bank.

Indian diplomacy will have to deal with such efforts.

Implications for India’s security

The Chenab-Beas Link may also become part of military signalling. Dams, barrages, tunnels and control systems will need protection against sabotage, cyberattacks, drones and precision weapons.

India must, therefore, treat water infrastructure as strategic infrastructure.

Its public rhetoric must also remain controlled.

India’s strongest position is not that it will stop water flowing to Pakistan. That claim is technically weak and diplomatically damaging.

The stronger case is that India will fully use the rights and capabilities available to it. It will not deliberately deny civilians their basic water needs.

But it will also not allow Pakistan to obstruct Indian projects indefinitely while pursuing a hostile policy towards India.

The proposed tunnel may carry a relatively small quantity of water. The precedent it creates could be much larger.

The project may begin changing how India uses its upstream geography.

Construction of the tunnel represents infrastructure development and greater freedom of action for India.

For Pakistan, it represents the possible weakening of the treaty’s original river divide.