Interview | Rising Defence Spending Driven By Conflicts And Tech: Former Diplomat Rakesh Sood

By M L Narasimha Reddy

Hyderabad: Global military expenditure is rising sharply as conflicts spread across regions and new technologies reshape warfare, according to former diplomat Rakesh Sood. In this interview with Eenadu-ETV Bharat, Foreign Policy and Strategic Affairs expert Sood explains that growing geopolitical tensions, from Europe and West Asia to Asia, along with the rapid integration of technologies such as artificial intelligence, space-based systems and missile defence, are pushing countries to increase defence budgets.

He points out that politics and historical factors remain the underlying drivers of militarisation, argues that weakened multilateralism is making the world more volatile, and reflects on the implications of the Iran crisis, Gulf security concerns, and India's balancing approach in West Asia.

Excerpts from the interview

Question: Global military spending reached a record high of $2.7 trillion in 2024 and is projected to reach $4.7 trillion by 2035, driven by geopolitical tensions. What are the consequences of this trend?

Rakesh Sood: There are two reasons why defence budgets across the world are going up. The first is the ongoing conflicts in different regions. We already have conflicts in West Asia. Gaza was already in conflict, and now tensions involving Iran are underway. In Europe, there is the conflict in Ukraine.

After the Cold War, during the 1990s, European defence expenditures had come down drastically. But now Europe has been increasing its defence spending again.

The second reason is that the US President Trump has urged his allies very directly and bluntly to increase their defence spending. As a result, many European countries are now raising their defence budgets.

Now, with tensions involving Iran, many Gulf states are increasing their defence spending as well.

In Asia, there has been significant Chinese military modernisation. China also has a number of maritime and territorial disputes.

Recently, we also saw President Trump declaring that the Western Hemisphere will be a priority area for the United States. I am sure this will also lead to some increase in defence expenditures in Latin America.

That basically leaves out the continent of Africa. Economically, many African countries are currently focused more on development issues. However, there are still many areas of instability. We see conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mali, Libya, and Nigeria. There are also growing offshoots of fundamentalist groups, as well as the ongoing conflict in the Congo. With these kinds of tensions, defence budgets are naturally bound to increase.

The other factor driving defence budget increases, particularly in the developed world, is technology.

Everyone is talking about the need to integrate artificial intelligence into the military domain. Secondly, there is increasing reliance on space-based assets for instant communication and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. These technologies also enable precision guidance for missiles and other systems.

As missiles become more widely available, countries are also investing heavily in early warning systems and missile defence systems. Obviously, poorer countries cannot easily access these technologies or systems. But countries that are at the technological forefront, such as the United States, China, and others that can afford it, are trying to maintain a technological advantage in the defence domain.

So the two fundamental drivers are:

• Rising geopolitical tensions and conflicts
• Rapid technological transformation in the military sphere.

Question: Does increasing military expenditure produce greater stability, or does it contribute to a culture of fear and higher conflict risks?

Rakesh Sood: As I said earlier, one driver is the increasing number of conflicts, and that is essentially politically driven. Simply increasing military expenditure is not the primary cause of conflict. Some people argue that when powers rise and decline, which is a natural historical process, a rising power will cause concern in a declining power, potentially leading to conflict. However, I think that explanation is an oversimplification.

The real driver of tensions is politics. When countries constantly refer to their glorious past or historical grievances, it creates problems. For example, China talks about overcoming the "century of humiliation". Russia talks about its former glory and argues that Ukraine is an integral part of Russian civilisation.

In the United States, there is a narrative that globalisation and migration have hollowed out the country. Iran also refers to its own historical legacy.

These are what I would call historical resentments. When political leaders use these resentments for domestic political purposes, it leads to militarisation and creates concern among neighbours and adversaries.

It is one thing to refer to a glorious past to motivate people to work harder so that the country progresses. But when countries constantly focus on past grievances or a supposed golden age, it creates tensions.

Naturally, this leads to rising defence expenditures.

In my view, politics is the main driver, not weapons themselves.

If relations between countries are improving, you will see arms control agreements, confidence-building measures, and disarmament negotiations, either bilaterally or through multilateral institutions like the United Nations.

One of the reasons why the United Nations appears to be at a standstill today is that the major powers have growing mistrust and an eroding sense of confidence about their place in global affairs.

So we see a lack of cooperation, a lack of trust, greater reliance on force, and preparation for worst-case scenarios. As a result, military expenditures increase.

Volunteers clean debris from a residential building damaged when a nearby police station was hit Friday in a U.S.-Israeli strike in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Question: Is the current global prioritisation of military investment over diplomacy and peace-building sustainable?

Rakesh Sood: Historians often draw parallels between the current situation and the world about 100 years ago, around the outbreak of World War I. At that time, there was also uncertainty, and countries began increasing their military preparedness. Then all it took was one incident in Sarajevo to trigger a chain reaction that drew in all the major powers and led to World War I.

Interestingly, no country actually wanted a full-scale war. A lot of historical research over the past 20 years has shown how the world sleepwalked into World War I.

Today, if countries are heavily armed and their militaries are fully prepared, and if political leadership in any major power is inclined to take military action, it could unintentionally pull other countries into a broader conflict.

In hindsight, people may say that nobody really wanted the conflict, but it happened anyway. What we are seeing today is that multilateralism is clearly taking a back seat.

Question: How close is Iran to developing a nuclear weapon, especially after the destruction of key nuclear sites?

Rakesh Sood: Right now, I think Iran is still some distance away from building a nuclear weapon. One major reason is that their Supreme Leader, who was killed on February 28, had issued a fatwa declaring nuclear weapons illegal and contrary to Islamic principles. Given his authority in Iranian society, this was an important restraining factor.

Now, the new leadership has not yet made any clear pronouncements.

On the other hand, last year, there were 12 days of intense bombing of Iran's nuclear infrastructure by Israel and the United States. Many sites were destroyed partially or completely, and several facilities are now under rubble. It is difficult to imagine that they have been fully reconstructed, especially given the severe sanctions Iran faces. In addition, several Iranian nuclear scientists were targeted and killed.

There are reports that Iran possesses around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. However, nobody knows exactly where this uranium currently is, whether it remains at damaged sites, lies buried under rubble, or has been moved elsewhere.

Converting that material into an actual nuclear device might take a few months, but testing it or ensuring that it can be fitted as a warhead on a missile is a more complex task.

Under normal circumstances, if Iran obtained sanctions relief, mobilised resources, and tasked its scientists with building a weapon, assuming a political decision was taken, I would say it could take around four to six months.

Question: How are Gulf states managing security risks after facing missile and drone threats?

Rakesh Sood: The Gulf Arab states were initially not in favour of this conflict because many of them had improved relations with Iran.

For example, Qatar has a working relationship with Iran because they share the world's largest gas field.

The UAE has also developed good relations with Iran, partly because the UAE serves as a major trading hub through which Iranians can access international commodities despite sanctions.

Saudi Arabia had long been in rivalry with Iran, but with Chinese mediation, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations and exchanged high-level visits in recent years.

So initially, none of the Gulf Arab states wanted a conflict that could destabilise the region and put them in the firing line between the United States and Iran, especially given the many US bases in the region that could be targeted by Iranian forces.

However, now that the conflict has begun and has become regionalised, there are two different views.

One view is that there should be a ceasefire as soon as possible.

Another view is that some Gulf states believe the conflict cycle between Israel, Iran, and the United States repeats every few years. Some may therefore want to see whether a broader change can occur. This brings up the term "regime change".

Now, one could say there has been a change in leadership in Iran with the appointment of a new Supreme Leader. But does that constitute regime change? Probably not, and certainly not in the way the external actors may want.

Historically, regime change is extremely difficult, even with troops on the ground. Afghanistan is an example: after the Taliban were removed in 2001, and after 20 years of international intervention involving trillions of dollars and thousands of troops, the Taliban ultimately returned to power. We saw similar challenges in Iraq.

In civilizational states like Iran, which have a history going back thousands of years, regime change cannot easily be imposed from outside.

Question: How might Russia and China leverage this conflict to reduce US influence in the Middle East?

Rakesh Sood: Russia is currently heavily tied down in the Ukraine conflict, so it does not have the political, economic, or military resources to play a major role in this conflict. China is watching the situation carefully. However, China also has its own security challenges in its maritime neighbourhood and is focused on issues such as Taiwan’s reunification.

China certainly has economic interests in the Middle East because it is heavily dependent on oil and gas imports from the region. But in terms of direct involvement, China will likely remain cautious.

Question: What is India's position on the conflict in West Asia?

Rakesh Sood: India has tried to balance both sides. Initially, India avoided clearly stating who initiated the conflict or what the provocation was. Instead, it emphasised the need for peace and dialogue, which is diplomatically safe but does not necessarily go very far.

The fact that Prime Minister Modi visited Israel just a day or two before the conflict began also sent a signal to some Arab states that India might be leaning closer to the Israeli-US position. At the same time, India initially did not convey condolences after the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader. Later, following some domestic political backlash, the Foreign Secretary visited and signed the condolence book, which was reported in the media.

Since then, there have been regular conversations between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi. Part of the reason is the presence of Indian nationals in the region and India’s own energy concerns.

The reality is that India and Iran share deep historical ties, and Iran is geographically close to India. There are structural drivers in the relationship that will not change. So perhaps we are now seeing a correction in the diplomatic balance.

Also Read

1. Analysis | The Iran War: A Strategic Balancing Test for India
2. Iran War And Energy Crisis: Should India Think Of Gas Swaraj Policy?