Can India And China Be Friends? The Best Time For These Asian Giants To Find Common Ground Is Now
In a fragmented world where the US retreats from its global stabilising role, Asia’s two great civilisations may find that cooperation is a necessity.
Published : April 19, 2025 at 2:16 PM IST
|Updated : April 19, 2025 at 5:24 PM IST
India and China—home to over a third of the world’s population—have long had a turbulent relationship marked by mistrust, territorial disputes, and competing ambitions. Yet, they are also deeply intertwined economically and now face a common challenge: the unpredictability of American policy under Donald Trump.
In the past week alone, Trump’s dramatic pause on sweeping tariffs caused a sharp reversal in global financial markets, from panic to euphoria. His trade policy, increasingly seen as erratic, has reminded the world that the US may no longer be the reliable partner it once was.
In this context, a question arises: can India and China, despite their differences, explore a functional relationship that serves mutual interests and balances a volatile United States?
The Paradox of Conflict and Commerce
India-China ties are defined by contradiction. The wounds of the 1962 war and standoffs like Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) remain fresh. Strategic mistrust lingers, especially with China's deepening ties with Pakistan and its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, bilateral trade is booming. China once again becomes India’s biggest trading partner, replacing the US. In the fiscal year 2024, trade between India and China reached US$118.4 billion.
Imports from China increased by 3.24% to US$101.7 billion, while exports to China surged by 8.7% to US$16.67 billion. India imported $3.6 billion worth of APIs (Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients), $13 billion of electronics, and over $4.5 billion of solar components. Even at the height of the Ladakh standoff, Chinese smartphone brands like Xiaomi and Vivo retained more than 35% market share in India. Indian pharma firms, too, continued sourcing 70% of raw materials from Chinese suppliers. This co-existence of geopolitical rivalry and economic interdependence makes China–India decoupling neither feasible nor desirable.
Trump’s Tariffs: Shock Therapy for the World
For those who believe in sovereign decision-making and economic planning, the past week has been humbling. A single tweet by Donald Trump, delaying tariff impositions by 90 days on April 9, transformed financial markets from fear to frenzy.
Trump’s advisors are trying to explain this chaos as a strategy. Stephen Miran, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, argues that tariffs are not just a protectionist tool, but are essential to rebalance global burden-sharing. He asserts that it is a way for the world to compensate America for its global financial role and for providing global security. Scott Bessent, Trump’s Treasury Secretary, offers a more strategic rationale: America’s industrial base is fragile. COVID-19 was a beta test for war, revealing that the US cannot make its own medicines, semiconductors, or warships. The solution, he argues, lies in bringing manufacturing back—even if it means coercive tariffs.
But these justifications are flawed. Trump’s tariffs, rather than building resilience, risk alienating allies like Mexico, Japan, South Korea and even India, pushing them closer to one another—and toward China.
Can China Fight America Alone?
This is the critical question haunting the Chinese. The answer is yes, but not without consequences. The US remains the world’s largest economy, with military bases across the globe and the dollar as the reserve currency. China’s military strength is growing, but it lacks a robust network of allies. It remains vulnerable to blockades of semiconductor equipment, advanced chips, and maritime choke points. In a prolonged conflict—economic or kinetic—China cannot take on the US alone.
This is where India becomes pivotal. As the world’s fifth-largest economy, India offers scale, manpower, and geographic advantage. A China-India understanding, even a limited one, could serve as a powerful counterbalance—not just to US economic aggression, but to Western strategic encirclement. Add Russia to this mix—already facing sanctions—and the potential trilateral axis acquires formidable weight.
India’s Strategic Hedging: A Calculated Middle Path
India’s foreign policy is deeply rooted in strategic autonomy. It has resisted military alliances and stayed flexible in turbulent times—from the Cold War to the Ukraine crisis. The current moment calls for a revival of multi-alignment. With Trump’s America becoming transactional and the West in disarray, India has reasons to keep doors open with China.
Both nations are key players in BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and G20, where they coordinate to resist Western hegemony and push for greater Global South representation. While these alignments do not erase strategic competition, they create diplomatic venues for functional cooperation on shared interests—climate resilience, tech innovation, and global financial stability. The following developments support the argument that both nations intend to improve their relations:
- Modi and Xi Jinping’s meeting at BRICS 2024 was positive.
- India and China have finalised buffer zones along the LAC, reducing troop contact.
- Chinese FDIs in India are being cleared on a case-by-case basis.
These are not signs of trust, but of calculated engagement. Mr Mao Keji, a Chinese strategic analyst, notes that Trump no longer sees India as central to the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Rather than deepening the strategic embrace as under Biden, Trump probably treats India like any other market for arms, energy, and technology exports. This commodification of the relationship puts pressure on New Delhi, which has long sought to exchange strategic alignment for privileged access and influence, without appearing to compromise its strategic autonomy.
Managing the Border: From Crisis to Containment
Following the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash, both sides initiated Corps Commander-level negotiations while diplomatic talks also continued. By late 2022, these engagements bore fruit. Buffer zones were established in five of seven flashpoints. In October 2024, agreements on the final two areas were announced, effectively reducing troop contact across the LAC. While the underlying dispute remains unresolved, the creation of buffer zones reflects maturity in conflict management.
This military de-escalation enables both governments to reallocate focus toward domestic priorities, especially economic growth and job creation, and reduce the chance of unintended escalation in an already volatile region.
Economic Complementarity: The Hidden Logic
Economically, China and India are more complementary than competitive. China is transitioning from an export-led model to domestic consumption, while India seeks to move from a services-heavy economy to a manufacturing hub. Chinese firms want access to India's large, youthful market; Indian manufacturers need investment, tech transfer, critical components for EVs, solar power, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors—many of which are cheaper or more readily available from China. Mutual economic incentives can, if carefully managed, underpin stability in relations.
Shared Global Views, Different Agendas
Beyond trade, India and China share key perspectives on global governance. Both advocate multi-polarity, oppose Western intervention in domestic affairs, and call for reforms in world institutions. Their positions on Ukraine, climate negotiations, and counterterrorism often align more than diverge.
Both nations are key players in BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the G20, where they coordinate to resist Western hegemony and push for greater Global South representation. While these alignments do not erase strategic competition, they create diplomatic venues for functional cooperation on shared interests—climate resilience, tech innovation, and global financial stability.
Domestic Pressures and Converging Incentives
Both Messrs Modi and Xi are under domestic pressure. Modi’s electoral majority has been dented, and India’s economy is showing signs of deceleration. Xi faces a cooling economy, youth unemployment, and growing global isolation. Both leaders are pragmatists, not idealists. Their desire to stabilise external fronts stems from a need to focus inward.
Public sentiment in India, once virulently anti-China after Galwan, has softened. Concerns about jobs and inflation have overtaken nationalism in social discourse. Indian businesses continue to lobby for stable trade ties with Chinese suppliers. Likewise, Chinese investors see India as one of the few large markets offering long-term demand growth.
Implications for India’s Security
Strategic engagement with China does not mean strategic surrender. India must and will continue strengthening its border infrastructure, ISR capabilities, and joint military exercises with partners like the U.S., Japan, and Australia. However, deterrence must coexist with dialogue.
A working relationship with China, even if limited and transactional, reduces the risk of a two-front military crisis with China and Pakistan, both of whom share robust defence ties. It also enhances India’s bargaining power with the West, particularly the US, which may take Indian interests more seriously if New Delhi signals it has options. In effect, engagement becomes a tool of deterrence, not its contradiction.
Conclusion: A Managed Rivalry, Not a Romantic Friendship
India-China rapprochement need not take the form of a strategic embrace. The trust deficit is deep, and regional competition will persist. But in a fragmented world where the U.S. retreats from its global stabilising role and great power competition turns erratic, Asia’s two great civilisations may find that cooperation, however limited, is a necessity, not a choice.
India may not align with China. It is asserting its autonomy. A cold peace with calibrated engagement may offer India the best chance to shape a regional order conducive to its rise. In the long arc of history, rivalries evolve, and adversaries talk. For India and China, the time to move from confrontation to cautious cooperation may finally be at hand.
If China cannot stand alone against American pressure, and India cannot rely blindly on American promises, then limited strategic coordination may serve both.
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of ETV Bharat)
Read More
